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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
An action brought by the Appellants asking for declaratory and injunctive relief brought on behalf of the
Appellants and all other persons similarly situated as both
taxpayers of the City of Ogden and as residents and homeowners in the dedicated subdivision of Ogden City.
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The Appellants have sought a determination as to
the validity of an ordinance passed by the Ogden City
Council closing and vacating a public street which the
Appellants believe was a part of a dedicated subdivision
known as the Argonne Park Plat, and the giving of the
closed and vacated public street to the Board of Education of Ogden City without any compensation whatsoever being paid to the City of Ogden or to the Appellants,
wherein the Board of Education of Ogden City was, and
is, the only abuttting landowner on said dedicated and
said closed and vacated public street; and whether said
action by the City of Ogden and by the Ogden City Council was a valid exercise of the authority and power of the
Ogden City Council and; further, whether the closing off
and taking away of a dedicated street in an allegedly
private plotted addition without the consent of the qualified electors of the City of Ogden or the homeowners of
a blighted subdivision without compensation constitutes
the taking of property without due process of law.
The Appellants are seeking the reversal of a lower
court decision wherein the Respondents were favored
with the dismissal of the Appellants', then Plaintiffs'
action. The lower court at a hearing on a motion for
temporary restraining order and on a complaint for declaratory judgment held that the action of the Ogden City
Council in the closing of the street and the giving of the
same by Quit Claim deed to the Board of Education of
Ogden City was not an abuse of authority o fthe Ogden
City Council acting for the City of Ogden, and that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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City of Ogden had complied with the charter upon which
it was founded together with the statutes of the State
of Utah which set forth the procedures as to public hearings and as to the procedure for the vacating of a public
street where the exigency existed in the public interest
and with public good and welfare.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek by defendaing this action on
appeal a sustaining of the dismissal in the lower court
and an order from the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah dismissing the action of the Appellants as set forth
in their demand to this Court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 27, 1973, a petition per letter was received
from William L. Garner, Superintendent of the Board
of Education of Ogden City, requesting that the Ogden
City Council close 29th Street between Tyler Avenue
and Harrison Boulevard, which street divides the school
building complex from the athletic field complex of the
Ogden High School, (R-85). This petition did come before the Ogden City Council on August 2, 1973. At this
time, the City Manager, Richard L. Larsen, was given
the responsibility to make a study concerning the possible
closing as requested by the Board of Education of Ogden
City, (R-119-20). Mr. Larsen requested his staff, including the Traffic Co-ordinator, the Ogden City Planning
Staff, and the Public Works Department, to give to him
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a preliminary opinion as to the possible effects of a closure of 29th Street, (Defendants' Exhibit 2) (R-86). On
September 6, 1973, the petition for the closing and vacating of 29th Street was once again brought before the
Council and was referred to the Ogden City Planning
Commission for its study and recommendations. On November 7,1973, the request to vacate that portion of 29th
Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue
was on the agenda of the Ogden City Planning Commission. On December 3, 1973, the Ogden City Planning
Commission received a memorandum from Graham F.
Shirra, Planning Director of the Ogden City Planning
Commission, Rulon H. Sorenson, Director of Public
Works, and Donald Godfrey, Traffic Engineer, in regard
to the vacation of 29th Street through the Ogden High
School campus at which time the pros and cons of the
closing of the street were discussed without a firm recommendation either for or against closing being the conclusion of the staff after extensive surveying, (Defendants'
Exhibit 3) (R-46-48).
Meanwhile, on November 29, 1973, an ordinance was
proposed at a regular meeting of the Council of Ogden
City for the vacating of 29th Street as a public street
between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. December 20, 1973, was set as the time for the public hearing
on the proposed ordinance to close 29th Street, which
public hearing was such that the Ogden City Planning
Commission and the Ogden City Council did hold a joint
hearing with the public at Ogden High School adjacent
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to the street proposed to be vacated, (R-19-20) (R-102).
On January 10, 1974, the Ogden City Council did entertain a motion to vacate 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, which motion was passed
and was based upon the public benefit, for the following
reasons:
1. It will improve the safety of vehicles
and children on Harrison Boulevard by allowing
relocation of the ball diamond and tennis courts
so balls will not go into the boulevard with children going after them.
2. It will improve the flow of traffic by
reducing the crossings at 29th Street and Harrison Boulevard where there is no traffic light,
and moves the traffic to 28th and 30th Streets at
Harrison Boulevard where traffic signals are located.
3. It will increase the safety of students
and those home activities at Ogden High School
by making it so they can get to school without
crossing a public street.
4. It substantially increases the safety and
convenience of students and faculty of Ogden
High School by removing a public street from
this campus allowing safe and easy access from
the school to its other facilities.
5. It doesn't interfere with access to the
other land east of the school or elsewhere, (R19-20).
Pursuant to the Ogden City charter and the laws of
the State of Utah, the ordinance, having been voted upon,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
was thereafter ordered to be published and to become
final twenty days after its final publication. The Board
of Education of Ogden City is the abutting landowner
on both sides of 29th Street between Tyler Avenue and
Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; and,
as such, is the individual to whom the property would
be deeded upon its vacation by Ogden City according to
law, (R-19-20).
The Ogden City Planning Commission, in a regular
session on January 2, 1974, did adopt a resolution that
the request of the Board of Education of Ogden City for
the closure of the 29th Street area be denied, in that the
advantages for the closure of said street were not sufficient to warrant a closure of an established street, (Defendants' Exhibit 5) (R-100). The Planning Commission
Chairman did, however, conclude that the reason for the
denial request and its granting by the Ogden City Planning Commission was not because of any feelings either
pro or con for the project but that they did feel that
they had not had sufficient information to make an adequate study so that they could have a more proper recommendation to the Ogden City Council, (R-103).
Great opposition was voiced against the proposed
project for the vacating of 29th Street, based upon conclusions that 29th Street was the lifeline for those citizens
of East 29th Street to traverse to and from their homes
and their businesses, but that such an objection was not
substantial inasmuch as other routes on 28th Street and
30th Street existed, which streets could take the addi-
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tional flow of traffic and thereby not develop into a traffic problem by the vacating of 29th Street.
ARGUMENT
POINT L
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE PERPETUAL RIGHT IN A DEDICATED STREET.
The Appellants have alleged that they are persons
who are homeowners or are purchasers of lots which
were originally dedicated in the Argonne Park Plat, which
plat dedication was to have been recorded on February
1, 1921, in the Weber County Recorder's office. The full
extent of the dedication plat of the Argonne Park was
not brought to a factual determination at the hearing
on the temporary restraining order on February 7, 1974,
because of the court's determination that the City of
Ogden had fully complied with all requirements for the
vacating of a street and, as such, with the District Court
subsequently granting a motion to dismiss said complaint.
The Argonne Park addition, however, as reduced here,
indicated that theaddition covered an area from Harrison
past Polk Avenue between 28th Street and 29th Street
in Ogden. The area between 28th Street and 29th Street
and Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue consisted of
the area on which the Ogden High School was built in
the mid 1930's, (opened in September, 1937). The property south of 29th Street between Harrison Boulevard
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SUPREME COURT EXHIBIT 1
ARGONNE PARK ADDITION
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9
and Tyler Avenue to and including 30th Street consisted
likewise of property owned by the Board of Education of
Ogden City on which the athletic fields were located, (R18 (See Supreme Court Exhibit 1).
The Appellants cite Tuttle vs. Sowadzkin, et al, 126
P. 959 (1912), which case they make reference to, as
being the determining case which declared the ownership
rights of individual lot holders in a dedicated plat. This
Court considered a fact situation where Salt Lake County
had received the dedication of a street entitled Wabash
Avenue between State Street and 2nd East Street. The
county after receiving the dedication of said street, did
not improve said street and pursuant to Comp. Laws
1907, Section 1116, failed to use or work on said road
for a period of five years, and as such did abandon said
dedicated street, and as such did lose the dedication of
the same. The Court in this case was making a ruling as
to subsequent purchasers of property abutting said dedicated portion of street as to their rights as abutting landowners subsequent to the abandonment by Salt Lake
County of said dedicated portion of the street. This
Court held that there was a distinction between the owners of property abutting said street prior to the abandonment by Salt Lake County of said portion of said street,
and those owners of property subsequent to said abandonment, in that it found that there existed two easements, a private easement and a public easement; and
further held that a private eastment in a highway will
continue to exist after the public easement has become
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extinct only in favor of those who owned a private easement, when the public one was extinguished, since, while
a private easement may survive the public easement, it
cannot "survive" unless both existed at the same time.
In this case, contrary to what Appellants perceive the
holding to be, the court dealt with abutting landowners,
those owners being property owners of record who owned
property which is adjacent to or abuts on a street. In
this regard, they did not make reference to a whole subdivision or a whole dedicated plat area, but only to those
individuals who own abutting property on a dedicated
street.
This Court further held that those abutting landowners who owned the property prior to the abandonment by the public entity did own and possess a private
easement on said portion of said highway or street, which
public easement gave to them a right which could not be
taken from them without due compensation for the value
of said right.
In the case now before this Court, the abutting landowner is the petitioner who requested that the City Council of Ogden City and all Defendants vacate 29th Street
between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, (R-85).
This would seem to negate the responsibility of Ogden
City giving just compensation to the abutting landowner
when thea butting landowner is the petitioner requesting
vacation of said street, and as such, who is not making
a demand against said City for compensation. Further,
the petitioner is the same individual who, by modifying
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29th Street into a full campus, is in effect relinquishing
its right of private easement over its own property.
In Appellants' brief, Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County,
104 P. I l l , (1909), was cited, which case was a predecessor to Tuttle vs. Sowadzki, cited supra, wherein the Court
did hold and make a distinction as to the public use being
that which was dedicated to the City or the County as
a street and that a conveyance in fee for said dedicated
purpose is a limited or a determinable fee and is created
only for a special purpose or purposes only. Once again,
this cited case deals with abutting landowners, and as
such explores the rights of said abutting landowners to
be compensated and to have their rights declared.
The Appellants rely on Boskovich, et al. vs. Midvale
City Corporation, 243 P. 2d 435, (1952), which case is
grossly similar to the case now before this Court in that
a portion of a street was vacated upon the petition of the
Board of Education. In the Boskovich case, the City of
Midvale failed to follow statutory procedure in the giving
of a proper notice, the holding of a fair hearing, and the
failure to consider substantial rights of those involved.
This Court further ruled, even if there may have been
proper due process roceedings, that the public and private
easements were distinct, and that the private easement
would remain and would have to be compensated for in
relation to those individuals within the subdivision plat
dedication, even though such compensation may be
meager as such. In that case, the facts distinguish it
from the instant case in that the Plaintiff, Boskovich, re-
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sided next to a school owned by the Board of Education
and abutted on a street that dead-ended into an 11-foot
alleyway. The vacation of the abutting street in front
of the school was such as to cul-de-sac the Plaintiff. The
Court held that the Plaintiff would still have his right
of private easement because of the extraordinary circumstance of having been dead-ended on a street which had
been to him a street which would, or could, be traversed
along that dedicated and vacated street to an alleyway
and along said alleyway to an exit from the subdivision.
The instant case distinguishes itself from theBoskovich
case in that the abutting landowner, who is the Board of
Education of Ogden City, is not so located that it would
cul-de-sac any of the Plaintiffs' nor prevent their access
along and over streets adjacent thereto, which streets
because of the closing of the instant street would not be
brought to an excessive traffic condition. Further, the
Appellants rely on the fact that the dedicated street is
wholly within a subdivision dedication existing from 1921,
which fact relates only to approximately 32.13 feet of a
99 foot right-of-way along 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, (see Supreme Court Exhibit 1). Thus, the facts that there is no cul-de-sacing of
the Plaintiffs and that any portion of the dedicated
streetway is only partial dedication would distinguish
it from the Boskovich case. This Court in Boskovich did
set as authority for its finding the Sowadzki cases where
the issue was as to abutting landowners and where this
was the main issue in action without an extension of the
same to all the members of the subdivision and all the
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members of the area and all the citizens of the City of
Ogden, which extension, if permitted, would in effect, prevent the City of Ogden, the City of Salt Lake City, or
any city or county public entity from acting in the best
interest and for the public good of the citizens of those
respective public entities.
The instant case is one where the charter provisions
of Ogden City having been complied with and the later
state statutory sections of 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended 1953, and the series of statutes commencing
thereafter with 10-8-8.1, which statutory sections were
enacted in 1955, were not in and of themselves inconsistent to deprive those involved with a reasonable notice,
a fair hearing, and a substantial opportunity to consider
the rights of all.
The Appellants attempt further to make a distinction
that in Stringham vs. Salt Lake City, 201 P. 2d 758,
(1949), and the further citing of McQuillan, Municipal
Corporation, 2nd edition, Volume 3, Section 981, p. 217,
and Thompson vs. Smith, 155 Vt. 367,154 S. E. 579, where
it is attempted to isolate the privilege of the City being
to control the streets for the benefit of the entire public,
which privilege is distinguished from a right in said streets
even after dedication. This argument goes to the effect
that the City as at a loss to vacate any street, alley, or
thoroughfare unless there is a public exigency or facts
which would indicate that the public would be protected.
In the instant case, such was the factual situation where
the public rights and interest were to be benefited not
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only to those Plaintiffs, but to all citizens of Ogden City
and all citizens whose children did attend the school complex located adjacent to 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. These citizens were to be
benefited not only through protection in preventing serious accidents to result in the crossing of said street, but
to have the beneficial opportunity to have an athletic
complex that is not separated by a street but is joined
for the benefit of the students, as well as those in the
surrounding neighborhoods and the City public in general, (R-20).
The Appellants feel that the lower court erred when
it cited Stone vs. Salt Lake City, 356 P. 2d 631, (1960).
It was, however, cited as an illustration where the Court
held:
There is no merit in this case insofar as statutes
are concerned. I believe the statutes have been
ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court in Stone
vs. Salt Lake City, and other decisions in 1960,
and later. There is no question that a legislative
body, either County Commissioners or City
Fathers can vacate dedicated streets if they follow normal procedures; otherwise, government
can never change and that this can be done (R123).
In the Stone case this Court ruled on a fact situation
when the city of Salt Lake City conveyed two parcels of
city-owned land for the construction, by the United States
Government, of a Federal Building; and the Court held
that, "the essential of procedural requirements, sale by
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city of its land is that there be notice, a reasonable opportunity for those interested to appear and be heard,
and fairness in the procedure in connection with the sale."
This was the sole purpose why the lower Court did cite
the Stone case, and as such, the Court merely wanted
to show that there had been a reasonable procedure followed consistent with the charter of Ogden City and the
laws of the State of Utah.
POINT II.

THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT DEPRIVED
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
Appellants cite numerous cases commencing with
Hall vs. North Ogden City, 166 P. 2d 221, (1946), and a
series of cases commencing with 1909 up to 1970 in an
attempt to show by these Utah cases aswell as the cases
of other jurisdictions, that there exists the need to fully
compensate all property owners who may be involved
when a city, county, or any municipal form of government
exercises dominion over the rights of streets and thoroughfares. The cases were cited to show that due compensation must be given to those individuals affected by a vacating of a street or thoroughfare, which street or thoroughfare these same people were to have had a property
right in. None of these cases fit into the fact situation
that is presently before this Court where a street running
between property owned by the Board of Education of
Ogden City, which vacated street has as its sole and only
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abutting landowners this same Board of Education of
Ogden City, which Board of Education being the Petitioner, is asking for the vacation of said street. It is a
given and foregone conclusion at law in the State of Utah
that property may not be taken without due process resulting in due compensation to thoce individuals who
have a property right in that property which is being
taken from them.
The Appellants submit the argument that all individuals throughout Ogden City, as well as the Plaintiffs,
have a right in said street, which would, under this conclusion, mean that any street, alley, or any thoroughfare
with a public right were to be vacated by the City of
Ogden or any municipality, that all citizens of that city
would have a property right existing within themselves
which property right would have value attached to it
that through a condemnation action would be such as to
compensate each individual citizen of a municipality. It
is more reasonable to look at the fact situation that is
before this Court, which fact situation shows and is traced
tto the earlier decisions on dedicated streets as far back
as the Sowadzki cases, supra. There the rights of adjoining or abutting landowners were the only rights which
were to be fruitful in receiving compensation when said
rights were taken from those abutting landowners by
method of legislative action. In Section 10-8-8.5, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended 1955, and as enacted by
the Legislature in 1955, the effect of the vacation of a
street is to relinquish the City's fee therein, "but the
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right-of-way and easements therein, if any, of any lot
owner and the franchise rights of any public utility shall
not be impaired thereby." This can only be interpreted
to mean the single abutting owner's rights-of-way shall
not be impaired nor his easement taken from him. The
instant case is such that the abutting landowner is the
petitioner for vacation of said street and as such is relinquishing his rights.
The Appellants cite the dedication plat terminology
that said streets in said dedication plat shall "remain
public thoroughfares forever." What of the needs of
public exigency? What of the rights vested in the cities
by the legislatures of both the state and the city, granting to the municipalities the right of condemnation and
the right to vacate streets for the public benefit and in
the public interest. It is submitted that if there is an
individual having a right to said vacated street, which
right is paramount to that of the City of Ogden, than that
individual should be compensated; but that inidividual
should not be, as the Appellants indicate, all citizens similarly situated, and all citizens that have traversed along
29th Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. The reason would have it that only those abutting
landowners who are affected should receive compensation, consistent with the Sowadzki precedent cases.
Further, as cited at another place within this brief,
only the 32.13 feet on the north side of 29th Street of a
street which is divided down at center in a 49.5' median
line was part of the Plaintiffs' and Appellants' question
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as to a dedication to the City in 1921 and subsequent to
the vacation of that portion in 1974, (see Supreme Court
Exhibit 1). The whole of the 99 feet is not in question.
The whole of the 99 feet of 29th Street was based on other
Quit Claim deeds given to the City of Ogden over the
years, and not solely from those individuals who did
acquire whatever rights they might have in the Argonne
Park addition to Ogden City.
Appellants cite as another argument that the agencies of the Defendant, namely, the Ogden City Planning
Commission, did fail to hold a public hearing consistent
with the Municipal Planning Enabling Act, 10-9-19, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, et seq., which act itself provides
for uniform planning, the holding of public hearings, and
the development of communities in a way that is consistent with the maintaining of orderly communities.
Through the testimony of the chairman of the Ogden
City Planning Commission it was established that a joint
meeting and hearing with the Ogden City Council was
held on December 20, 1973, as per the minutes of the
meeting of the Council of Ogden City on that same date,
(R-19). After said public hearing, the Ogden City Planning Commission did recommendf to the Ogden City
Council that said petition for vacation be denied, (R100). The recommendation for denial was based on the
fact that there had been a possible lack of information
given to the Ogden City Planning Commission members
for them to make a positive finding, (R-102).
Appellants with delight cite that the Ogden City
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Planning Director, Graham Shirra, the Public Works Director, Rulon Sorenson, the Traffic Engineer, Donald
Godfrey, and R. L. Larsen, the Ogden City Manager,
opposed the vacating of 29th Street. The fact as cited
in the testimony in the transcript of said hearing was
that Graham Shirra, Rulon Sorenson, and Donald Godfrey joining in a letter dated December 3, 1973, which
letter is marked as evidence, (Defendants' Exhibit 3),
wherein it is suggested that because of the pros and cons
that the above three gentlemen and staff members of
Ogden City's Planning, Public Works, and Traffic Department, recommended neither adoption of the petition
or denial of the petition but stated that the City Council
of Ogden City could decide in what direction the citizens
of Ogden would be best benefited, which fact is their prerogative, (R-96) (R-108-109) (R-110).
The City Manager, R. L. Larsen, based upon his
position as a member of the Ogden City Planning Commission, did request denial of said petition based on his
reason that he lacked complete information for him to
make a proper decision.
For some reason or other, the Ogden Standard Examiner editorials are cited by the Appellants as well as
petitions indicating the feelings of many citizens east of
29th Street, 28th Street, and 30th Street above the vacated 20th Street section. The citing of these particular
feelings do not represent the need of the public, which
was considered by the City Council, which represents
not only those citizens on 29th Street but the citizenry of
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the whole of the City of Ogden, and as such, are merely
documents as so entitled and are of no probative value.
In Robinette vs. Price, 280 Pacific 736, (1929), in a
case where a street was closed and the property owners'
means of ingress, egress were interfered with, this Court
held that merely the depriving of the Plaintiff of his
direct route to and from the main business portion of the
City causing a depreciation of property value as well as
rendering rental more difficult in view of decreasing
rental value did not constitute compensable damages.
Further, in the Springville Banking Company vs.
Burton, 349 Pacific 2d 157, a 1960 case which itself dealt
with eminent domain, held, in a fact situation dealing
with the State Tax Commission impairing the right of
ingress and egress from Plaintiffs' property along a state
highway, that "if the sovereign exercises its police power
reasonably and for the good of all the people when constructing highways, consequential damages such as those
alleged here are not compensable; on the other hand, if
public officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably causing,
for example, total destruction of the means to get in and
out of one's property, without any reasonable justification
for doing so in the public interest, in a manner that imposes a special burden on one not shared by the public
generally, principles of equity no doubt could be evoked
to prevent threatened action of such character or to remove any instrumentality born of such conduct." The
foregoing cases, although dealing with condemnation actions of the State of Utah, are such that compensation
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was denied where private rights existed for both ingress
and egress, which is what the Appellants are attempting
to have this Court rule upon. These cases stand as precedent when no compensation should be granted where the
the mere ingress and egress of a direct route is interfered
with and when there are additional routes of travel into
that subdivision or platted area in question. Therefore,
it is submitted by the Respondents that although it is
believed that only the abutting landowners in this situation shoud be compensated for any loss of a private right,
the fact of ingress and egress for other owners within this
same area is not a compensable right; and the facts, that
there were adequate notices, proper hearings and strict
adherence to the charter of the City of Ogden and the laws
governing the vacating of a street, are such that they
have been complied with, and in no way have the rights
of those other individuals been abused or interfered with.
POINT III.
THERE IS NO FACTUAL FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE ABUSED THEIR
DISCRETION OR ACTED FRAUDULENT
OR IN ANY ILLEGAL MANNER IN THE
VACATING OF SAID STREET.
In the vacating of 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, the lower Court did hold
in its bench ruling that all applicable laws had been complied with and that the finding of the Court was that
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this had been al egislative action and that the judiciary
had no right to set aside the said vacation unless the
statutes and ordinances of the City of Ogden had been
abused. In Springville Banking Company vs. Burton,
supra, the Court held that if the public officials did act
arbitrarily or unreasonably then question would be raised
as to the act in question. In Rhees vs. D. E. Mund, 245 P.
2d 284, (1952), in an Arizona Supreme Court decision, the
Court held, "The City Council of the City of Phoenix
in vacating and abandoning the alley in question acted
in a legislative capacity, and the Court cannot question
the wisdom or discretion or advisability of its action except for fraud or other illegality or absence of jurisdiction
to abandon." Further, in People vs. City of Pomona, 200
P. 2d 176, (1949), the Court held in a case involving the
vacating of a street that Appellant did have the burden
of demonstrating that sufficient evidence was produced
to show that the City Council abused its discretion in
vacating the public street for purposes other than for
public good and welfare.
The instant case exemplifies that the City Council
of the City of Ogden did exercise proper discretion in
vacating the street for proper public purposes and for
the benefit of all citizens. The charter of the City of
Ogden, being the charter law under which the City of
Ogden must function, and the laws of the State of Utah,
with regard to the vacating of a street for a public purpose, are consistent. Once a hearing has been held after
proper notice has been given to all citizens and the rights
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of all have been taken into consideration, the City Council of the City of Ogden does have authority and did,
through a legislative action, vote for the closure of 29th
Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue,
thus, not acting arbitrarily or unreasonably or in fraud
or illegally or in absence of jurisdiction in the carrying
out of this public interest action.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby respectfully submitted to the Court that
the issues are squarely met, that the Respondents have
complied with the laws of the State of Utah and have
complied with the granting to all parties reasonable notice, a fair public hearing, and a consideration of all issues
relating to the vacation of 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue in Ogden, Weber County,
Utah. There is no evidence that there had even been
any abuse of discretion or that there had been fraud or
illegality on the part of the Respondents. The charter of
Ogden City, together with the laws of the State of Utah
have been fully complied with. The only cases in point
deal with abutting landowners where an abutting landowner did raise a complaint and where this court ruled
in favor of the abutting landowner and directed that due
compensation, how much or how little, not being resolved,
be tendered to the abutting landowners. Our situation
is one where the abutting landowner is a party requesting
dedication. He receives a deed to that property belonging
to the City of Ogden which abuts on his property form-
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erly known as that land between 29th Street and Harrison Boulevard.
It is requested by the Respondents that the complaint and petition before this Court of the Appellants
be dismissed and the lower Court's decision in this matter
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
L. KENT BACHMAN
Chief Asst. Corporate Counsel
527 Municipal Bldg.
P. 0. Box 1639
Ogden, Utah 84402
Attorney for Respondents
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